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Introduction
The Republic of Turkey began its privati-
zation initiative in 1984 in an attempt to loosen
the state’s grip on the economy and move
towards more free market principles. In order
to understand the Turkish privatization expe-
rience, one must first understand the Turkish
economy prior to this 1984 initiative. When the
Republic of Turkey was established in 1924 by
Atatürk, the primary goal was to strengthen the
economy. Following World War I, the fledg-
ling country had no industry, no entrepre-
neurial spirit, and, most of all, no savings.
Ataturk tried to focus on implementing lib-
eral, free-market economic policies; however,
the economic climate at the time was not yet
ready for a move in this direction. Instead, state
economic enterprises (SEEs) were formed. SEEs
can be used by a government for advancing its
industrial economic policies. They are com-
prised of one or more businesses where the gov-
ernment owns at least a fifty percent share in
the enterprise. In order to accelerate eco-
nomic development, SEEs were formed in
Turkey adhering to state-centered economic
policies well into the 1950s.
After 1950 the Turkish government again
attempted to implement more liberal economic
initiatives. However, private sector growth was
stagnant, and the government decided that
the only way to promote growth was through
further expansion of the public sector. From the
1960s to the 1980s Turkey’s economy became
increasingly “mixed.” (Ertuna, p. 4) By 1985
SEEs were responsible for nearly 12 percent
of Turkish GDP. Since the 1980s, Turkey has fol-
lowed more liberal economic policies in trying
to institute free markets, with the objective of
integrating the Turkish economy with the rest
of Europe and the world. Thus, the privatization
initiative began in 1984. (Ertuna, p. 4)
In the following sections of this article, I
first discuss the background of privatization and
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how the initiative began in Turkey. In addi-
tion, I explain the approach that the government
used in setting up the framework for privati-
zation and the difficulties experienced in its
early privatization efforts. Finally, I give an
overview of the privatization initiative’s success,
both economically and socially. Turkish privati-
zation has been a long and difficult process since
its inception in the mid-1980s, fraught with
legal battles and judicial interventions; however,
privatization advanced greatly in the early 2000s
and offers a promising future.
Privatization Background and
Turkish Privatization
Privatization most commonly means the
transfer of state ownership of industrial and
commercial activities either totally or partially
to the private sector through a sale of public
assets. Privatization has been one of the most
crucial macroeconomic policy issues occupying
the agenda of governments of many developed
and developing countries since the UK launched
a heavy divestiture program in the late-1970s.
Privatization processes have crucial social, eco-
nomic, and legislative effects on the countries
that implement such programs; and thus it is
not just a simple task of selling state economic
enterprises to domestic or foreign corporations.
The privatization process needs to be viewed
as a multidimensional process and should be
implemented with care.
Turkey began its privatization initiative in
1984 when the government commissioned an
official report to evaluate the state of the econ-
omy and the benefits of undergoing a privatiza-
tion effort. The results of the study were pub-
lished in a “master plan” by the Morgan
Guaranty Bank in May 1986. (Tecer, p. 4) The
explicit objectives for the privatization program
were identified in this report as:
1) To transfer the decision-making
processes of large corporations and
national assets from the public to the
private sector to ensure a more effec-
tive play of free market forces.
2) To promote competition, improve effi-
ciency, and increase the productivity of
public enterprises.
3) To enable a wider distribution of share
ownership.
4) To reduce the financial burden of the
state economic enterprises on the gen-
eral operating budget.
5) To raise revenue for the Treasury. (Yel-
dan, p. 13)
The “master plan” included a list of 32 SEEs that
were to be privatized, as well as a plan to des-
ignate other enterprises for subsequent privati-
zation. (“Privatization Endeavor in Turkey,”
p. 2) Some of the companies that were tar-
geted for immediate privatization were Tur-
izm Bank, Turkish Airlines, Teletas, and the
Turkish cement conglomerate, Citosan.
What Can Be Privatized in Turkey?
State Economic Enterprises, their sub-
sidiaries, operations, operational units and
assets are all available for privatization. (“Priva-
tization Endeavor in Turkey,” p. 4) Public shares
and shares in commercial organizations that are
not SEEs, but where the majority shares rest
with the state, are also available for privatiza-
tion. In addition, assets producing goods and
services with national and supplemental bud-
gets (dams, lagoons, highways, hospitals, ports,
etc.) can be placed in the portfolio for privatiza-
tion as well. In the privatization portfolio there
are currently several electric utility and distri-
bution companies, as well as national ports wait-
ing to be privatized.
Methods of Privatization
Turkish attempts to privatize public assets
generally have comprised three types of sales
techniques: block sales, public offers for flota-
tion, and direct sales of assets and facilities of
the SEEs and their subsidiaries. The first
method is regarded as the least desirable from
the point of view of economic competition
and efficiency, since it is often the case that
block sales of majority shares lead to creation of
private monopolies. Public offers and direct
sales have been mostly conducted through the
Istanbul Stock Exchange, with approvals from
the Privatization High Council (a governing
body comprised of cabinet officials responsible
for the privatization initiative) and the Com-
petition Board (a government commission
charged with encouraging economic competi-
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tion). As a sales method, privatization via pub-
lic offering has been limited, while block sales
have accounted for more than a third of the pri-
vatization receipts. Reliance on block sales as
a “big-bang” solution has led to widespread alle-
gations of fraud and corruption as well as under-
valuation of the privatized assets.
Privatization Implementations
during the Period 1985–2009
Since 1985 state shares in 188 state-owned
companies have been privatized. The first priva-
tization attempt in Turkey was the sale of Tele-
tas in 1988. The sale of Teletas, a very profitable
company in the telecommunications industry,
took place in a public offering with a set price
on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. During the pri-
vatization, 22 percent of the corporation was
sold to the public.
From 1991 to 1997 the leading sectors pri-
vatized in Turkey were the cement industry, the
iron and steel industries, airport and ground
services, aircraft tires, public banks, and elec-
tricity and energy. In most cases, state owner-
ship was less than 50 percent in these corpo-
rations; and when privatized these shares were
either transferred fully to the private firms or
sold via the Istanbul Stock Exchange. As can
be seen in Figure 1, privatization in Turkey
got off to a very slow start, grossing only $9.49
billion in the 20-year span from 1985–2004.
As will be discussed in a subsequent section of
this article, the dramatic rise in privatization
revenue between 2005 and 2009 can be largely
attributed to foreign direct investment inflows
(FDI) into Turkey during this time period.
Legal Barriers to Privatization
The lack of sufficient attention to the legal
framework of privatization has been the most
important reason for Turkey’s limited success
during the first two decades of the program. The
previously mentioned “master plan,” prepared
for the government by Morgan Guaranty Bank,
included a study of the Turkish legal system to
determine the factors that could present pos-
sible roadblocks for Turkish privatization. (“Pri-
vatization Endeavor in Turkey,” p. 4) The study
concluded that the Turkish constitution did not
outlaw privatization; however, it noted that
the existing legislation was deficient in facilitat-
ing the process.
When Turkey began its privatization ini-
tiative, it used a 1984 law interestingly enough
entitled the Law to Motivate Savings and to
Accelerate Government Investments as the basis
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Figure 1
Privatization Revenue in Millions of US Dollars from 1985–2009
Source: “Privatization Endeavor in Turkey.”
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of its legal framework. This law authorized the
government to securitize the revenues of hydro-
electric dams and toll bridges by issuing “rev-
enue sharing certificates.” (“Privatization
Endeavor in Turkey,” p. 2) In June 1986, the law
was modified by empowering the Council of
Ministers (a body comprised of all of the heads
of the major ministries) to decide upon the
privatization of SEEs. This law enabled the
transfer of ownership of the SEEs to the pri-
vatization portfolio while automatically grant-
ing the SEE the legal status of “corporation,”
thus making the SEE one step closer to being
a private company. This law, however, did not
outline explicitly the role of the government
in privatization proceedings and did not provide
a sufficient legal framework to administer pri-
vatization. Furthermore, it did not solve some
of the implementation problems related to labor,
managerial, and financial restructuring issues
— namely, the special audit requirements to
which the SEEs were subject and certain
employment regulations applicable to SEEs.
(Ertuna, p. 15)
According to the Turkish Constitution,
SEEs must be audited by a special auditing body
which is not required to abide by the structured
rules applied to private companies. As a result,
accurate financial records for SEEs were not
accumulated; and when it came time for pri-
vatization of an SEE, it was difficult for the gov-
ernment to establish a fair and accurate valua-
tion for the entity. The constitution also requires
that SEEs be managed by government civil ser-
vants. Therefore, the management scheme
imposed by the constitution did not provide can-
didates for privatization with the competitive
culture needed for success in a free market —
namely the ability to employ a properly expe-
rienced management team to lead the company.
(Ertuna, p. 15) In addition, the newly privatized
corporations were forbidden from implement-
ing incentive-based compensation systems that
were needed for operating in a free market
system.
Unfortunately, Turkey did not think that it
had the time to make changes in the law to facil-
itate privatization and attempted to carry out
privatization without making the necessary
changes in legislation. This strengthened the
position of those who were against privatization
in principle, and many of the original privatiza-
tion cases were challenged in the judicial sys-
tem and some of the early decisions were
reversed.
Legal Missteps in Early Privatizations
The 1989 privatizations of the cement pro-
ducer Citosan and the catering service USAS
to foreign investors via block sales provide good
examples of the missteps that occurred early on
in the privatization endeavor. The sales of both
of these companies to foreign investors were
undertaken without first being offered to the
employees and the Turkish people, as the law
required. The controversy led to criticisms by
trade unions and the media, and eventually
opposition parties brought the debate before the
Parliament. (Ficici, p. 10) After a series of
legal debates, the Council of State (the high-
est administrative court in Turkey) overturned
the $105 million sale of 51 percent of Citosan’s
stake in cement plants to Societe des Ciments
Francais and the $14 million sale of USAS to
Scandinavian Airlines. (Ficici, p. 11) The Coun-
cil of State also ordered the government to rene-
gotiate the deals and offer the shares to employ-
ees of the two firms in its ruling that
privatization should be offered to the Turkish
people first. (Ficici, p. 11)
The sale of Petkim in 1990, a profitable,
wholly state-owned petrochemical company,
was a long and arduous process. Petkim was a
monopoly and employed 8,000 workers who had
a strong trade union with influential connec-
tions with the parties in opposition to privatiza-
tion. (Ficici, p. 11) The proposed sale brought
adverse reactions from the union and political
groups that regarded Petkim as a public enter-
prise that was too important to the Turkish
economy to be privatized. In this privatiza-
tion, the government abided by the law, first
offering the shares to Petkim’s employees and
to the public. However, when these groups only
bought eight percent of the shares, the gov-
ernment looked into selling the rest of the com-
pany to foreign buyers. This proposal brought
even more opposition from the trade unions
who were concerned with job losses and who
feared foreign investor participation in the econ-
omy. Using their political influence and playing
to Turkish nationalism, the unions were able to
delay privatization for many years with lawsuits.
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Ultimately, Petkim would be sold to SOCAR
(State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic),
Turcas (a Turkish petrochemical company), and
Injaz Projects of Saudi Arabia for $2 billion in
2008. (Ficici, p. 11)
The troubled privatizations of USAS,
Citosan, and Petkim exemplified the many flaws
in early privatization legislation. Mainly, they
demonstrated the need for a clearly defined role
for the government in privatization proceedings.
Furthermore, these cases illustrated the neces-
sity for oversight bodies to ensure that com-
petition and free market principles would pre-
vail and that unions and political lobbyists
would have a minimal role in privatizations.
Since these needs were not addressed until well
into the privatization initiative, costly delays and
unnecessary legal battles ensued.
First Attempt at Legal Reform
By the early 1990s the government recog-
nized the fact that it needed a comprehensive
legal base to accelerate privatization imple-
mentation and to meet the objectives set for
privatization by Morgan Guaranty Bank’s “mas-
ter plan.” But instead of passing a comprehensive
law to deal with privatization, the government
decided to side-step major reform by designing
new regulations. (“Privatization Endeavor in
Turkey,” p. 3) As a result, a law was passed
through Parliament in 1994 empowering the
Council of Ministers to issue governmental
decrees regulating privatization instead of craft-
ing comprehensive privatization reform legisla-
tion. As mentioned before, in the original pri-
vatization legislation of 1986 the Council of
Ministers’ only power in this regard was to
authorize the sales of SEEs. This broadening of
the scope of the Council’s authority represented
amajor change in the privatization process. Soon
various decrees were issued in order to acceler-
ate privatization, creating special rules and excep-
tions to facilitate sales. (“Privatization Endeavor
in Turkey,” p. 5) But again this law was chal-
lenged in the high court, and both the new leg-
islation as well as the decrees subsequently issued
were soon repealed. (“Privatization Endeavor in
Turkey,” p. 5) The high court claimed that pri-
vatization required legislative action and that pri-
vatization authority could not simply be dele-
gated to the Council of Ministers.
Second Round of Legal Reforms
On November 24, 1994, the current priva-
tization legislation was enacted in the form of
Law No. 4046. The law was welcomed by both
citizens and government officials in hopes
that it would solve all the privatization problems
of Turkey. Public expectations were elevated
with intensive propaganda by various govern-
ment agencies claiming that SEEs were “the
cause of all ills in Turkey, including inflation.”
(“Privatization Endeavor in Turkey”, p. 3)
According to the Turkish government, the law
served several functions that facilitated the
privatization movement. It expanded the scope
of assets to be privatized, provided a frame-
work for the transactions to occur, and allocated
the proper funds and appropriate mechanisms
to speed up the privatization and restructur-
ing processes. (“Privatization Endeavor in
Turkey,” p. 2) Furthermore, the law estab-
lished several government oversight bodies in
charge of privatization and a social safety net for
workers who would lose their jobs as a result
of privatization. In short, the law addressed
the major needs that became apparent after
the early missteps in the privatization initiative.
Bodies Responsible for Privatization
under Law No. 4046
Under Privatization Law No. 4046, the pri-
vatization process is carried out by two bodies:
the Privatization High Council and the Priva-
tization Administration. The Privatization High
Council (PHC) is the ultimate decision-mak-
ing body for privatization in Turkey. The PHC is
composed of the Prime Minister, the State Min-
ister, the Minister in Charge of Privatization, the
Minister of Finance, and the Minister of Indus-
try and Commerce. (“Privatization Endeavor
in Turkey,” p. 2) The PHC nominates SEEs for
privatization by placing them in the privatiza-
tion portfolio. The portfolio consists of a group
of SEEs and assets that have been deemed by the
PHC to be suitable for privatization. A major cri-
terion for selection is that the company be prof-
itable and therefore attractive to domestic and
international investors. (Tecer, p. 9) The PHC
then selects certain industrial sectors for priva-
tization at different points in time. Currently,
the spotlight is on privatizing electrical distri-
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bution grids and shipping ports in Turkey.
Furthermore, the PHC is responsible for deter-
mining the method and timing of the privatiza-
tion procedures and ultimately grants the final
approval for the sale.
The Privatization Administration (PA) is
the executive body for the privatization process.
It is a legal public entity that reports directly
to the Prime Minister. (“Privatization Endeavor
in Turkey,” p. 2) The PA’s major duties include
executing the PHC’s decisions, advising the PHC
in matters related to the transfer of SEEs into
or out of the privatization portfolio, and the
restructuring and rehabilitating of SEEs in
order to prepare them for privatization. If the
PA and PHC deem that an SEE no longer fits
their vision for privatization or that the SEE
is not sustainable without government interven-
tion, the PA and PHC have the power to remove
it from the privatization portfolio.
Competition Regulations
Another legal issue addressed in Law No.
4046 concerned protecting the public from
the abuses of monopolies, such as excessively
high prices for goods, poor quality and serv-
ice, and an anemic level of innovation. (“Pri-
vatization Endeavor in Turkey,” p. 3) Privati-
zation is generally more successful when an
SEE is purchased by a non-monopolistic entity
in a competitive market. Such an environ-
ment usually fosters price competition and
higher levels of product quality and customer
service. In the case of the privatization of nat-
ural monopolies, it is essential that the regu-
latory environment be well established to
eliminate possible exploitation of customers
and deterioration of services. (“Privatization
Endeavor in Turkey,” p. 3) It took time for
Turkey to establish the legal structure to
strengthen competition. In 1994, with the pass-
ing of Law No. 4046, the Competition Board was
established in Turkey with its mission to protect
the entire competitive process. The board has
the power to resolve disputes between firms,
deal with monopoly situations, and oversee
mergers and acquisitions. The Competition
Board is notified in advance of the sale of an SEE
by the purchasing entity to ensure that the
transaction does not result in the formation of
a monopoly. Only after Competition Board
approval does the Privatization Administra-
tion authorize the sale. (“Privatization Endeavor
in Turkey,” p. 4) In addition, a company whose
total market share exceeds 25 percent that
desires to take over any SEE needs to obtain a
permit from the Competition Board before
beginning the tender process. (“Privatization
Endeavor in Turkey,” p. 4) These measures are
intended to help prevent monopolies from form-
ing. However, even with the far-reaching influ-
ence of the Competition Board, many experts
feel that it will take still more time to develop
the “competitive culture” needed for the success
of privatization.
Privatization after Legal Reform
Even after the second round of legal
reform, net privatization revenues to the Turk-
ish government were meager from 1994–2004.
The only sizeable privatization revenue was
recorded in 2000 ($2.1 billion) under the close
supervision of an International Monetary Fund
(IMF) program. Turkey received loans from
the IMF to help reduce inflation and lower
real interest rates in an effort to make Turkey
a more desirable place for foreign investment.
The IMF program called for sizable privatization
receipts that would limit the growth of the pub-
lic debt and drastically decrease public invest-
ment in SEEs. The results of the program
turned out to be disappointing, however, as pri-
vatization revenue from 2001–2004 remained
low. The most recent IMF agreement, cover-
ing the period May 2005 to May 2008, had more
ambitious targets for privatization. Turkey’s Let-
ter of Intent, outlining planned economic
reforms required in advance of receiving an IMF
loan, stated that by the end of 2005 the major
public assets of Petkim, Tupras, Edemir, and
Turkish Telecom were to be sold. (“Letter of
Intent and Memorandum . . . ,” pp. 14–16) The
Letter of Intent also stated that the lower bound
of the privatization receipts by the end of
December 2005 would be no less than $1.5
billion and that the target was to be regarded as
a “performance indicator” of the “successful
implementation of the IMF Program.” (“Letter
of Intent and Memorandum . . . ,” pp. 12–14) In
fact, during the calendar year 2005 a total of
$8 billion worth of state owned companies were
sold, shattering the IMF target of $1.5 billion.
84
As can be seen from previous Figure 1, pri-
vatization revenue in Turkey not only increased
dramatically in the year 2005 but remained high
through 2008. During this period direct invest-
ment by foreign entities in the productive assets
in Turkey also exhibited an upward trend. The
allure of this foreign direct investment (FDI),
along with a stable legal framework and the
aid of the IMF, provided the requisite conditions
for privatization to be successful. Figure 2 shows
the positive correlation between foreign direct
investment inflows and privatization revenue.
While privatization revenue has increased along
with foreign direct investment, privatization
revenue has still not increased at the same
rate as FDI, hinting that privatization may com-
pete with FDI during periods of economic
expansion. This might be due to the fact that
FDI offers a simpler and more direct vehicle
for investors as opposed to the highly regulated
procedures associated with privatization.
Privatization has been continuing strongly
in Turkey despite the global economic crisis.
In 2008 the final privatization of Petkim was
completed for $2 billion as well as another
public offering of shares in Turkish Telecom. A
push to privatize parts of the Turkish infrastruc-
ture culminated in the 2009 announcement that
Turkey would sell its 20 electricity distribution
networks under a plan to boost investment in an
industry where demand is rising by about 8
percent per year. (“Turkey Could Exceed . . .”)
Payments for the grid are expected to be more
than $7 billion in a direct asset sale. In addition,
the rights to operate several ports have been
placed in the privatization portfolio to be sold.
Turkey’s Reliance on Block Sales
As can be seen in Table 1, the most widely
used approach to privatization during the
1985–2009 time period has been block sales. A
block sale occurs when a significant portion of
an SEE is sold in a private transaction and offers
the simplest means to privatization. Block sales
in Turkey constituted 52 percent of the offers of
public assets, followed by 18 percent in asset
sales, and 3 percent in public offerings on the
Istanbul Stock Exchange. However, the block
sale method is regarded as the least desirable
option from the point of view of economic com-
petition and efficiency, since it is often the
case that the block sale of the majority of shares
can lead to the creation of private monopolies.
Still, privatization via block sales is a means
for the government to push the process along
at a faster pace, allowing for more immediate
revenue. This focus on block sales also indicates
a shift away from the ideals put forth at the
initiative’s onset and toward the goal of just rais-
ing revenue to improve the government’s fis-
cal balance sheet.
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Figure 2
Foreign Direct Investment and Privatization Revenue from 2002–2008
Source: “Privatization Endeavor in Turkey” and “FDI in Turkey.”
Turkey’s Efforts to Help Laid-Off
Workers
Along with the growth of the privatiza-
tion initiative in the early 2000s, Turkey also
launched with the help of the World Bank a
social support initiative to help affected workers.
This initiative, called the Privatization Social
Support Program, ran from 2001–2005 and
consisted of $250 million of World Bank loans.
(“Implementation Completion Report . . . ,”
p. 13) The program created two major
channels for helping the Turkish workforce: a
job-loss compensation initiative and a labor rede-
ployment service. (“Implementation Completion
Report . . . ,” p. 13)
The objective of the job-loss compensation
program was to ameliorate the temporary neg-
ative social and economic impact of lost jobs
as a result of the privatization of SEEs. This
component financed initial severance and on-
going unemployment payments, as regulated by
law, to workers displaced due to the privatiza-
tion of SEEs. Along with severance pay and
forced retirement, the Turkish government also
set up temporary employment programs for
affected workers. Under Law 657 4/C, workers
laid off from privatized SEEs were given the
chance to be temporarily employed by govern-
ment offices and bureaus. Of the 21,532 work-
ers who applied for this program, 17,731 were
granted positions. (Yaviliog˘lu and Özsoy, p. 26)
The labor redeployment services enacted
by the Turkish government were also widely
used by affected workers. The objective of this
component of the social support program was
to aid workers who have been displaced by the
privatization of SEEs, including secondary
layoffs after the initial employment cuts from
the privatization, and to assist them in rapidly
re-entering the labor market. This component
financed labor training through two major
agencies: the Turkish Employment Agency
(ISKUR) responsible for aiding unemployed
workers, and the Small and Medium Industry
Development Agency (KOSGEB) which serves
as an incubator for new business formation.
Under this effort, ISKUR trained 26,704 work-
ers, with nearly half of them finding new jobs.
(Yaviliog˘lu and Özsoy, p. 26) In addition,
KOSGEB developed 6 training centers that
served 34,000 workers and launched 533 new
firms. The World Bank was encouraged by these
results and the commitment that the Turkish
government demonstrated to the support pro-
grams. In fact, the initiative was extended by the
World Bank from 2005–2009 at a cost of $581
million.
Conclusions
This article has examined the privatization
initiative in Turkey, with a focus on the legal
struggles and challenges that have marked its
evolution. With a strong legal framework finally
established in the early 2000s and increased for-
eign direct investment inflow, the stage was
set for Turkey’s economic liberation. As other
nations have realized Turkey’s promise and
more investment has flown into the nation, it is
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Table 1
A Breakdown of Privatization Proceedings by Method
Source: “Privatization Endeavor in Turkey.”
apparent that the initial goal of spreading
ownership of SEEs has given way to a focus
on quickly producing revenue, as demonstrated
by the Privatization Administration’s focus on
block sales. Turkey’s efforts under the World
Bank program to help workers retrain and be
placed in new jobs have also been an impor-
tant part of the privatization program and stand
to help affected workers well into the future
as privatizations continue. As the world econ-
omy restructures after the global economic cri-
sis, it will be interesting to see how fluctuations
in FDI inflows and investment compete with
Turkey’s lofty goals for privatization in the com-
ing years.
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